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COURTS-MARTIAL AND THE
CONSTITUTION
CHESTER J. ANTIEAU*
GRAND JURY INDICTMENT
Prosecutions of persons subject to military or naval authority are
expressly excepted from the Constitutional requirement of grand jury
presentment or indictment.'
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The prohibition on double jeopardy contained in the Fifth Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States2 is binding upon courts-
martial. The phrase, "except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces," qualifies only the preceding grand jury clause, and it is a justi-
fiable inference that the benefits of the prohibition against double jeop-
ardy were intended for members of the armed forces.3
Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the United States Supreme Court,
has stated:
"Congress, by express constitutional provision, has the power
to prescribe rules for the government and regulation of the
Army, but those rules must be interpreted in connection with
the prohibition against a man's being put twice in jeopardy for
the same offense. The former provision must not be so inter-
preted as to nullify the latter. If, therefore, a person be tried for
an offense in a tribunal deriving its jurisdiction and authority
from the United States, and is acquitted or convicted, he cannot
again be tried for the same offense in another tribunal deriving
its jurisdiction and authority from the United States."4
*B.S., M.S., Detroit Institute of Technology; J.D., Detroit College of Law;
Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law; Member of Michigan Bar;
Member of the State Bar of Michigan Committee on Administrative Agen-
cies, and of the Committee on Conflict of Laws of the Association of Ameri-
can Law Schools.
I "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service
in time of war or public danger; . . ." Fifth Amendment, United States Con-
stitution. The last phrase qualifies only the word "militia." Johnson v. Sayre,
158 U.S. 109 (1895).
2 ". .. nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb."
3 "We have no doubt that the provision of the Fifth Amendment, 'nor shall
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb,' is applicable to courts-martial. The immediately preceding ex-
ception of 'cases arising in the land or naval forces' from the requirement
of an indictment, abundantly shows that such cases were in contemplation
but not excepted from the other provisions." Judge Sibley, for the Fifth
United States Court of Appeals, in Sanford v. Robbins, 115 F.(2d) 435, 438(1940).
4Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 352 (1907). This case denied the
constitutionality of a second trial in a federal civil court for the same offense
earlier tried by a military court-martial.
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A federal court has recently held the Constitutional ban on double
jeopardy binding on an Army court-martial. In Wade v. Hunter,5 a
soldier had been exposed to trial by a court-martial which adjourned
without rendering judgment. He was subjected to another trial by a
different court-martial and found guilty. Under the federal "urgent
necessity" rule, there is no former jeopardy if the first trial was ter-
minated because of urgent or imperious necessity. The Court considered
this rule applicable to courts-martial, but held the facts showed no such
need; "the absence of witnesses, rather than an emergency due to the
military situation" seemingly being "the reason for the withdrawal of
the case from the court-martial which first heard it."
'6
On the false assumption that an accused in the armed forces is
denied all the guarantees of the Fifth Amendment, because of the
phrase limitative only of grand jury indictment, a federal district court
has held the Constitutional ban on double jeopardy not binding on a
naval court-martial.7 This is an unsound decision. In fact, the Navy
has recognized the applicability of this Constitutional prohibition to its
courts."
The 40th Article of War decrees:
"No person shall, without his consent, be tried a second time for
the same offense; but no proceeding in which an accused has
been found guilty by a court-martial upon any charge or speci-
fication shall be held to be a trial in the sense of this article until
the reviewing and, if there be one, the confirming authority shall
have taken final action upon the case."
Where an accused has been found guilty, and the reviewing author-
ity has ordered a new trial, there is no double jeopardyY This is suffi-
ciently analogous to the rule that there is no double jeopardy by a second
trial ordered upon an appeal perfected by the accused.10 The 40th
Article of War also provides that there shall be no re-trial of a finding
of acquittal.11 This Article of War is constitutionally deficient only in
embodying an unsatisfactory definition of jeopardy. The traditional
military plea of "autrefois acquit" is completely inadequate to safeguard
the constitutional rights of a soldier or sailor who has been exposed to
successive trials, none of which resulted in judgment. Under the ac-
cepted federal rule a person is assuredly in jeopardy before his trial
has been reviewed, even before he has been acquitted, and, indeed, be-
5 72 F.Supp. 755 (D.C., Kansas, 1947), in 48 Col.L.Rev. 299 (1948).
6 Id, at 763-4.
7In re Wrublewski, 71 F.Supp. 143 (D.C., S.D., Calif., 1947).
s "Naval Courts and Boards," official publication of the Navy (1937), p. 217.
9 Ex parte Steele, 79 F.Supp. 428 (D.C., M.D., Penna., 1948).
10 Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905).
11 "No authority shall return a record of trial to any court-martial for re-
consideration of-(a) an acquittal; . . ."
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fore the trial has come to an end.12 There is less excuse for exposure to
multiple trials in the armed forces than in civil courts. The greatly in-
creased possibility of witnesses becoming unavailable, the probability
of defense counsel being assigned elsewhere, the absence of anything
comparable to bond, all militate against any indulgence in a court-
martial concept of jeopardy satisfied only by rendition of judgment on
review.' 3
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INcRIMINATION
Evidence procured by unreasonable search and seizure should be
inadmissible at trial by court-martial, following the long-established
federal rule.'4 Present practice of both Army15 and Navy'16 courts con-
forms to such a rule.
Hicks v. Hiatt1 7 clearly holds that a soldier accused of crime is
entitled to the Constitutional protection against self-incrimination. This
case decided that "the comment of the trial judge advocate as to (de-
fendant's) failure to make a sworn statement before trial was highly
prejudicial to (the defendant) and constituted reversible error.""' Both
the Army'9 and the Navy 20 admit the applicability to an accused of this
Constitutional protection against self-incrimination.
DUE PROCESS OF LAW
A soldier or sailor before a court-martial is entitled to due process
of law, under the Fifth Amendment. To posit a contrary notion regard-
ing the rights of American citizens called to defend their country upon
12 "The weight of authority, as well as decisions of this court, have sanctioned
the rule that a person has been in jeopardy when he is regularly charged
with a crime before a tribunal properly organized and competent to try him."
Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 128 (1904).
23 Wade v. Hunter, note 5 above, properly found court-martial jeopardy before
judgment. As in that case, when an accused has presented his defense, the
prosecution has rested, and the court-martial closed, there is jeopardy within
the proper meaning of the term. The undesirability and unfairness of the
Army interpretation is well illustrated by the Judge Advocate General's de-
cision that a soldier was not tried in an earlier case wherein the court was
assembled, the prosecution had completely presented its case, and then a
nolle prosequi was entered by the appointing authority. JAGQ-CM 302833
(1946).
14 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) ; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383 (1914).
:i C.M. 161760 (1924); C.M. 196526 (1931).
16 In re Meader, 60 F.Supp. 80, 81-2 (D.C., E.D., N.Y., 1945) ; U.S. Navy C-M
Order No. 11 (1929), p. 11; USN C-M Order No. 3 (1943), p. 47.
17 64 F.Supp. 238 (D.C., M.D., Penna., 1946).
28 Ibid., at 245.
19 The 24th Article of War provides: "No witness before a military court, com-
mission, court of inquiry, or board, or before any officer conducting an in-
vestigation, or before any officer, military or civil, designated to take a
deposition to be read in evidence before a military court, commission, court
of inquiry, or board, or before an officer conducting an investigation, shall
be compelled to incriminate him or to answer any question not material to
the issue or when such answer might tend to degrade him." See also G.M.
187610 (1929), and C.M. 199315 (1932).
20 Naval Courts and Boards," official publication of U.S. Navy (1937), p. 160.
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language in Ex parte Quirin,21 which concerned the trial of enemy sabo-
teurs, is most unwise.12 Due process of law may not make identical
demands upon military and naval courts-martial as upon criminal pro-
cedure in the federal civil courts, but certainly an American soldier
is a "person" entitled to due process under the Fifth Amendment.23
DUE PROCESS OF LAW (a) LACK OF JURISDICTION
It is well established that a court-martial of one not subject to mili-
tary or naval authority is lacking in jurisdiction and accordingly viola-
tive of due process of law.24 A court-martial is entitled to no presump-
tion of jurisdiction," nor can the lack of jurisdiction be waived.26
A void enlistment confers no jurisdiction.27 However, a minor en-
listing fraudulently and without consent of parents is subject to military
jurisdiction,28 the enlistment being only voidable at the act of the
parents.
20
An officer on inactive duty is not subject to the jurisdiction of a
military tribunal, and it has been further held that such officer is still
beyond the jurisdiction when recalled to active duty only to permit
prosecution."0
Jurisdiction is ordinarily terminated by discharge from the service.
This is covered capably elsewhere, 1 and only a later case need be noted
here. Durant v. Hironimus3 2 recently held that a court-martial has no
jurisdiction over an officer on terminal leave, even though the army pay
continued during the leave period.
2163 S. Ct. 2 (1942).
22See, for an example, the language of Judge Frank, for the Second United
States Court of Appeals, in United States ex rel. Innes v. Crystal, 131 F.(2d)
576, 577 fn. 2 (1943>.
23 Reaves v. Ainsworth, 55 L.Ed. 225, 228 (1911) ; United States v. Hiatt, 141
F.(2d) 664, 666 (C.C.A. 3d, 1944); Hicks v. Hiatt, 64 F.Supp. 238, 244, 245,
246, 247, 249, 250 fn. 27 (D.C., M.D., Penna., 1946); Henry v. Hodges, 76
F.Supp. 968, 973-4 (D.C., S.D., N.Y., 1948); Anthony v. Hunter, 71 F.Supp.
823, 831 (D.C., Kansas, 1947).
24 Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65 (U.S. 1857); Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13
(1879); Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564 (1885); McClaughry v. Deming,
186 U.S. 49 (1901); Carter v. McClaughry, 105 Fed. 614 (C.C.A., Kan., 1901)
affd. 183 U.S. 365; Rose v. Roberts, 99 Fed. 948 (C.C.A. 2d, 1900) ; Ex parte
Henderson, 11 Fed. Cas. 1067, No. 6347, (C.C.A., Ky., 1878); Cole v. Blanken-
ship, 30 F.(2d) 211 (C.C.A., 4th, 1929); VerMehren v. Sirmyer, 36 F.(2d)
876 (C.C.A. 8th, 1929).
25 Geo. L.J. 538 (1947), citing cases.
26VerMehren v. Sirmyer, 36 F.(2d) 876 (C.C.A. 8th, 1929).
27 Hoskins v. Pell, 239 Fed. 279 (C.C.A. 5th, 1917).
28 In re Morrisey, 137 U.S. 157 (1890).
29 United States v. Reeves, 126 Fed. 127 (C.C.A. 5th, 1908) ; Ex parte Rush, 246
Fed. 172 (D.C., M.D., Ala., 1917).
30 United States ex rel. Sanantonio v. Warden, 265 Fed. 787 (D.C., E.D., N.Y.,
1919); United States ex rel. Viscardi v. MacDonald, 265 Fed. 695 (D.C.,
E.D., N.Y., 1919).
31 Comment, "The Amenability of the Veteran to Military Law," 46 Col. L.R.
977 (1946); and Note, 36 Geo. L.J. 445 (1948).
32 73 F.Supp. 79 (D.C., S.D., W.Va., 1947) ; in 16 Geo. Wash. L.Rev. 142 (1948),
21 Temp. L.Q. 426 (1948), and 96 U. of Pa. L.Rev. 440 (1948).
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DUE PROCESS OF LAW (b) IMPROPERLY CONSTITUTED COURT
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that an improperly
constituted court-martial has no jurisdiction over the accused.33
The old 4th Article of War made only officers eligible for member-
ship on courts-martial. That such a court-martial composed only of
officers was unconstitutional for the trial of an enlisted man was
charged, but found otherwise by the Court. 4 The revised 4th Article
of War, effective February 1, 1949, provides that "no enlisted person
shall, without his consent, be tried by a court the membership of which
does not include enlisted persons to the number of at least one third
of the total membership of the court." Violation of this provision would
deprive a court-martial of jurisdiction.
Under the old 4th Article of War 35 it was customarily held that
a general court-martial was not improperly constituted although the
law member was not an officer of the Judge Advocate General's De-
partment.36 Even where the record showed that at least two members
of the JAGD were available, a federal court held that this was "un-
questionably a matter, which lies for determination, in the sound dis-
cretion of the officer who appoints the court-martial."37 A contra re-
sult was reached in another federal court, when an available JAGD
officer served not as law member, but as assistant trial judge advocate.38
The revised 4th Article of War decrees more positively:
"The authority appointing a general court-martial shall detail as
one of the members thereof a law member who shall be an officer
of the JAGD or an officer who is a member of the bar of a Fed-
eral court or of the highest court of a State of the United States
and certified by the Judge Advocate General to be qualified for
such detail."
Gone is the alternative which permitted the law member to be one
completely untrained in the law. In the future, any failure to appoint
a proper law member will result in an improperly constituted court
devoid of jurisdiction.
33 McClaughry v Deming, 186 U.S. 49 (1902).
4 Adams v. Hiatt, 79 F.Supp. 433 (D.C., M.D., Penna., 1948).
35 "The authority appointing a general court-martial shall detail as one of the
members thereof a law member, who shall be an officer of the Judge Ad-
vocate General's Department, except that when an officer of that department
is not available for the purpose the appointing authority shall detail instead
an officer of some other branch of the service selected by the appointing
authority as specially qualified to perform the duties of law member."
36 Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19, 25 U.S. 19 (1827).37 Henry v. Hodges, 76 F.Supp. 968, 976 (D.C., S.D., N.Y., 1948).38 Brovn v. Hiatt, 17 Law Week 2247 (Nov. 17, 1948).
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DUE PROCESS OF LAW (c) INADEQUATE PRE-TRIAL INVESTIGATION
A "thorough and impartial investigation" is required by the Articles
of War3 9 before any charge is referred to 'a general court-martial.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1946 intimated that a gen-
eral court-martial would be divested of jurisdiction by failure to pro-
vide a thorough and impartial investigation of the charges.4 0 The fol-
lowing year a federal district court held that failure to provide such
an investigation stripped the court-martial of jurisdiction.4 1 Another
federal court, which the same year held that an investigation conducted
by "the originator of the charges and the accuser in fact" was not
enough to deprive the court-martial of jurisdiction,42 was overruled
on appeal by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.4 The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals has likewise held that a court-martial was without
jurisdiction when the accused was not afforded a thorough and im-
partial pre-trial investigation,4 as has the Federal District Court for
the Southern District of New York in a fine opinion by Judge Ryan,
who granted habeas corpus to a military prisoner whose investigation
was conducted by his accuser who refused to call witnesses for the
accused, and who later testified against him at the trial.4 5
It is suggested that the above courts unwisely posit their insistence
upon a fair and complete investigation upon the Articles of War. A
strong argument can be made that neither the Congress nor the Judge
Advocate General consider the demands of the Articles jurisdictional, 4
39 Old 70th Article of War: "No charge will be referred to a general court-
martial for trial until after a thorough and impartial investigation shall have
been made. This investigation will include inquiries as to the truth of the
matter set forth in said charges, form of charges, and what disposition of
the case should be made in the interest of justice and discipline. At such
investigation full opportunity shall be given to the accused to cross-examine
witnesses against him if they are available and to present anything he may
desire in his own behalf, either in defense or mitigation, and the investigat-
ing officer shall examine available witnesses requested by the accused. If
the charges are forwarded after such investigation, they shall be accompanied
by a statement of the substance of the testimony taken on both sides."
New AW 46b (effective February 1, 1949) inserts after the second sentence:
"The accused shall be permitted, upon his request, to be represented at such
investigation by counsel of his own selection, civil counsel if he so provides,
or military if such counsel be reasonably available, otherwise by counsel
appointed by the officer exercising general courts-martial jurisdiction over
the command."
40Reilly v. Pescor, 156 F.(2d) 632; certiorari denied, 329 U.S. 790. The sen-
tence was here upheld because justified by charges which had been ade-
quately investigated.4 1 Anthony v. Hunter, 71 F.Supp. 823 (D.C., Kans., 1947), in 57 Yale L.J. 483
(1948).
42 Ex parte Smith, 72 F.Supp. 935 (D.C., M.D., Penna., 1947).
48 Smith v. Hiatt, 170 F.(2d) 61 (C.C.A. 3d, 1948).
44 Benjamin v. Hunter, 169 F. (2d) 512 (C.C.A. 10th, 1948).
45 Henry v. Hodges, 76 F.Supp. 968 (D.C., S.D., N.Y., 1948).
46Waite v. Overlade, 164 F.(2d) 772 (C.C.A. 7th, 1948); Dissenting Opn. of
Circuit Judge Goodrich, in Smith v. Hiatt, 170 F. (2d) 61, 66 fn. 1; 57 Yale
L.J. 483 (1948).
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so courts professing to base decision upon Congressional grounds are
in a precarious position. Far better and sounder that the requirement
of adequate investigation of the charges be based upon due process of
law. Traditionally all accused of crime have been afforded certain safe-
guards in advance of trial. A criminal defendant customarily has an
investigation by the police, a determination by a prosecuting official, a
grand jury indictment47 or information, and probably a hearing before
a committing magistrate. Certainly an accused before a court-martial
-almost always unable to have civilian counsel of his own choice, and,
because of his incarceration, having inadequate opportunity to prepare
his defense 4 -- is, at the very least, entitled to a thorough and impartial
investigation of the charges as due process of law.4 9 Obviously there is
no fair trial, in any sense of the term, when an accused is tried without
the opportunity to assemble evidence to prove his innocence.
DUE PROCESS OF LAW (d) USE OF INVOLUNTARY CONFESSION
It can be stated unequivocally that a court-martial conviction based
upon an involuntary confession, within the usual meaning of this con-
cept,50 will be unconstitutional.51
47"The functions of the investigating officer, as contemplated by Article of
War 70 are those ordinarily performed both by the civil prosecuting officer
and the grand jury. These functions are described in 'The Soldier and the
Law' by McCoomsey and Edwards (at page 155) as being 'similar in many
respects to a grand jury investigation in which the grand jury determines
whether a man is to be tried."' District judge Ryan, in Henry v. Hodges,
76 F.Supp. 968, 974 (D.C., S.D., N.Y., 1948).
48 "While one of the purposes of the prescribed pretrial procedures is to de-
termine whether charges shall be brought against a member of the armies of
the United States, a primary purpose is to enable the accused to prepare his
defense. The soldier cannot avail himself of the means of procuing wit-
nesses and pertinent testimony so readily available to a civilian defendant.
Under such circumstances the employment of the investigative techniques
prescribed by the Articles of War and the Courts-martial Manual is essential
if the accused is to enjoy a fair trial." Biggs, J., in Hicks v. Hiatt, 64 F.Supp.
238, 249 (D.C., M.D., Penna., 1946).
The thorough and impartial pre-trial investigation "was intended not only
to prevent unnecessary trials of charges founded upon insufficient evidence
and to afford protection to an accused from such charges, but also to grant
to him, restricted as he is by his military service, an opportunity of probing
into the facts of the charge and to uncover evidence, if available, which
might lead to his ultimate exculpation, both by direct evidence and testimony
of witnesses who could give affirmative proof as to his innocence, as well
as testimony which might affect the credibility of the witnesses upon whom
the prosecution depended to establish proof of guilt." Ryan, J., in Henry v.
Hodges, 76 F.Supp. 968, 973 (D.C., S.D., N.Y., 1948).
49 "Whether failure to do the things required be construed as a defect preclud-
ing the acquiring of jurisdiction or whether the failure be held to deprive the
accused of the due process contemplated by the organic law, the result is
the same. Relief should be granted by a court of general jurisdiction,
charged with the responsibility of inquiring into the legality of the detention
of the accused." Anthony v. Hunter, 71 F.Supp. 823, 831 (D.C., Kans., 1947).
See also cases cited in note 48.50 Antieau, "The Admissibility of Confessions," 9 Detroit L.Rev. 43, 87, (March,
June 1948).
51 Brown v. Sanfbrd, 170 F. (2d) 344, 345 (C.C.A. 5th, 1948); Winthdrop on
Military Law (2d ed., 1920) p. 328; and note Winthrop's sound recommen-
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DUE PROCESS OF LAW (e) VAGUE AND INDEFINITE STATUTES
The Articles of War and the Articles for the Government of the
Navy abound in vague and uncertain prescripts. What are the "re-
proachful or provoking speeches or gestures" forbidden by the 90th
Article of War? Or the "contemptuous or disrespectful words" of the
62nd Article? Or the "threatening or insulting language" of the 65th
Article? When is a sailor in danger of engaging in "any other scandal-
ous conduct tending to the destruction of good morals," interdicted
by the Eighth Article for the Government of the Navy? What is "con-
duct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman" prescribed by the 95th
Article of War? And what beacons of behavior are furnished by the
omnibus clause of the 96th Article which enjoins soldiers to avoid "all
disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and military disci-
pline"? It is no defense of these mystical mandates to assert that a
specification will inform the accused of the particular misdeed; the
Constitutional abhorrence of these vague and indefinite rules is posited
primarily upon their inadequacy as guides to one who would be law-
ful.52 If anything, the requirements of clarity and guidance should be
applied more vigorously to military and naval rules than to the civil
statute, for the vague becomes meaningless to one suddenly projected
into an alien societal context. Convictions under any of these "pre-
scripts for psychoanalysts", as Cardozo would have described them,6
have no claim to constitutionality.
DUE PROCESS OF LAW (f) A COMBINATION OF FACTORS RESULTING IN
THE MILITARY PROCEDURE BEING ADMINISTERED IN A
FUNDAMENTALLY UNFAIR WAY
Due process of law demands that courts-martial be administered
with the same "fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of
justice,"54 required of our civil courts. Judge Mars has said well "that
dation: "In military cases, in view of the authority and influence of superior
rank, confessions made by inferiors, especially when ignorant or inexperienced
and held in confinement or close arrest, should be regarded as incompetent,
unless very clearly shown not to have been unduly influenced," at p. 329.
The new 24th Article of War amends the former by the addition of this
paragraph: "The use of coercion or unlawful influence in any manner what-
soever by any person to obtain any statement, admission or confession from
any accused person or witness, shall be deemed to be conduct to the prejudice
of good order and military discipline, and no such statement, admission, or
confession shall be received in evidence by any court-martial. It shall be the
duty of any person in obtaining any statement from an accused to advise him
that he does not have to make any statement at all regarding the offense of
which he is accused or being investigated, and that any statement by the
accused may be used as evidence against him in a trial by court-martial."
52United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921).
53 Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933).
54 "As applied to a criminal trial, a denial of due process is the failure to ob-
serve that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice."
Roberts, J., in Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941). "Fundamental
fairness" test applied in Boone v. Nelson, 72 F.Supp. 807 (D.C., S.D., Me.,
1947).
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this basic guarantee of fairness, afforded by the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment applies to a defendant in criminal proceedings in
a federal military court as well as in a federal civil court."5 5 There is
no conceivable reason why "the basic standard of fairness which is
involved in the constitutional concept of due process of law' 56 should
not be respected by military tribunals trying American citizens called
to the defense of their country.
Denial of "fundamental fairness" will be found most frequently
in a combination of improprieties. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
in 1943 found a want of due process in this combination of factors
alleged by the soldier: (1) denial of right to be represented by military
counsel of his choosing; (2) incompetent counsel; (3) refusal to call
witnesses in his behalf; (4) denial of his right of confrontation; (5)
intimidation of defense witnesses; and (6) conviction of one crime
when charged with another. The case was remanded for a new trial
to determine the truth of these allegations.5 7
Another federal court discharged from custody a soldier when it
found that the military procedures "were not applied in a fundamental-
ly fair way."58s Here, (1) the investigator failed to warn the accused
that his statements would be used against him; (2) the investigator
failed to examine all the witnesses requested by the accused; (3) the
accused was not permitted to examine adverse witnesses during the
investigation; (4) the investigator suppressed a considerable body of
evidence valuable to the accused; (5) the accused was cross-examined
at the trial on prejudicial matters not relevant; (6) witnesses for the
prosecution were permitted to testify to hearsay and irrelevant matters
prejudicial to the accused; (7) the trial judge advocate was permitted
to make prejudicial statements concerning the failure of the accused
to make a sworn statement during the investigation; (8) inadmissible
evidence was received; and (9) the conviction was received though the
Court indicated it had a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.
Clearly justice is not done by retreating into the apologetics of an
absolete concept of limited habeas corpus review.59 Where congeries
of unfairness such as the above characterize courts-martial proceedings,
due process of law demands that sentences thereunder be reversed.
55United States v. Hiatt, 141 F. (2d) 664, 666 (C.C.A. 3d, 1944).
56 Hicks v. Hiatt, 64 F.Supp. 238, 250 (D.C., N.D., Penna., 1946).
5 Schita v. King, 133 F.(2d) 283 (C.C.A. 8th, 1944), cert. denied Schita v.
Pescor, 322 U.S. 761.58 Hicks v. Hiatt, 64 F.Supp. 238 (D.C., M.D., Penna., 1946).
59 "The Scope of Review over Courts-Martial on Habeas Corpus," 41 Ill. L.R.
260 (1946).
1949]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
DUE PROCESS OF LAW (g) SENTENCE BEYOND THE POWER
OF THE COURT-MARTIAL
It is firmly established that a sentence beyond the power of court-
martial to impose for the particular offenses of which the accused was
found guilty is invalid.60
An unanimous vote of guilty is required only where the death sen-
tence is mandatory; other findings of guilty may be sustained with less
than an unanimous vote. But where the sentence of death is optional,
the vote on the sentence-though not on the finding of guilt-must be
unammous.
Although it is customarily said that the sufficiency of the evidence
before a court-martial will not be reviewed on habeas corpus, it has
been assumed that a total absence of evidence would deprive the court-
martial of jurisdiction and avoid a sentence so imposed.'
RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION
The Constitutional right of an accused in a criminal prosecution to
be confronted with the witnesses against him,63 is, on principle, appli-
cable to an accused before a court-martial. This safeguard would be
denied to a member of the armed forces by some on the theory that
court-martial trial is not really a "criminal prosecution", 64 but what the
notion .possesses in ingenuity it lacks in both logic and policy. Further-
more, this fundamental right of an accused can reasonably be held to
be essential to the fair trial required by the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment. 5 It is assumed by the federal courts that this
Constitutional right of an accused is not to be denied by courts-mar-
tial.66 In the light of the above, the use of depositions by the prosecu-
tion, as permitted by the 25th Article of War,67 is assuredly unconstitu-
tional. The overwhelming weight of authority has held unconstitu-
tional the attempted use of deposition evidence by the prosecution in
60 Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365 (1902).61Artice of War 43; Stout v. Hancock, 146 F.(2d) 741 (C.C.A. 4th, 1944),
certiorari denied, 325 U.S. 850; Hurse v. Caffey, 59 F.Supp. 363, (D.C., N.D.,
Texas, 1945).6 2 Boone v. Nelson, 72 F.Supp. 807 (D.C., S.D., Me., 1947). See also: Chariton
v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913); In re Watts, 190 U.S. 1 (1903); Ex parte
Cuddy, 131 U.S. 280 (1889); Clewans v. Rives, 104 F.(2d) 240 (C.A., D.C.,
1939); In re Schmidt, 68 F.Supp. 765 (D.C., N.D., Calif., 1946).
63 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
confronted with the witnesses against him." Sixth Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States.64 Winthrop, Military Law (2d ed., 1920), p. 287 note. But observe the same
author's admission elsewhere: "Military courts, however, though not bound by
the letter (of the Sixth Amendment), are within the spirit of the provision."
Op. ctd., p. 165 (italics in original).65 Rottschaefer, Constitutional Law, 1939, p. 797.
66 Schita v. King, 133 F. (2d) 283 (C.C.A. 8th, 1944); Hicks v. Hiatt, 64 F.Supp.
238 (D.C., N.D., Penna., 1946).
67 "A duly authenticated deposition taken upon reasonable notice to the opposite
party may be read in evidence before any military court or commission in
any case not capital, or in any proceeding before a court of inquiry or a
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criminal proceedings, 6 and the mere residence of a witness "beyond
the distance of one hundred miles from the place of trial" is no justi-
fication for depriving an American citizen of a right so fundamental,
so precious, and so necessary in a situation sufficiently conducive to
inquistorial trial.
DENIAL OF COUNSEL
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States re-
quires that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right. . .to have the assistance of counsel for his defence." Trial by
court-martial is a "criminal proceeding" if the nature of the trial and
resultant incarceration are meaningful characteristics. The denial of
counsel to a member of the armed forces charged with a serious crime
finds justification neither in the necessity nor the practice of the mili-
tary, and assuredly not in concepts of "fair trial" fundamental to our
way of life.
The United States Court of Claims has held that the Sixth Amend-
ment's requirement of counsel applies to courts-martial. 69 The Court
further ruled that the right to counsel embraces, as elsewhere, time for
counsel to adequately prepare the defence.70
The new 11th Article of War requires that defence counsel be either
a "member of the judge Advocate General's Department or an officer
of the bar of a Federal court or of the highest court of a State" when-
ever the trial judge advocate is either of the aforementioned.
In 1943 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that there was no
violation of the Sixth Amendment when counsel chosen by the accused
was not a lawyer, nor was there transgression in the exclusion of ac-
cused's civilian associate counsel from a part of the trial involving
military secrets.71
In Ex parte Benton,7 2 a federal prisoner alleged that "the counsel
assigned to defend him before the court-martial that tried him was so
unqualified, incompetent, inefficient, negligent and unfaithful in the
military board, if such depositions be taken when the witness resides, is
found, or is about to go beyond the State, Territory, or district in which the
court, commission, or board is ordered to sit, or beyond the distance of one
hundred miles from the place of trial or hearing, or when it appears to the
satisfaction of the court, commission, board, or appointing authority that
the witness, by reason of age, sickness, bodily infirmity, imprisonment, or
other reasonable cause, is unable to, or, in foreign places, because of non-
amenability of process, refuses to, appear and testify in person at the place
of hearing . . ." (effective February 1, 1949).
68 Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911); Diaz v. United States, 223
U.S. 442 (1912); Wigmore on Evidence (2d ed.) sec. 1398.69 Shapiro v. United States, 69 F.Supp. 205 (1947), in 35 Geo. LJ. 538 (1947),
and 5 Nat. B.J. 348 (1947).70 Ibid, at 206-7. No such time to prepare the defense was found in the facts of
the case wherein counsel was appointed at 12:40 p.m. and went to trial at
2 p.m. the same day at a place 35 to 40 miles distant.
7'Romero v. Squier, 133 F.(2d) 528 (1943), certiorari denied 318 U.S. 785.72 63 F.Supp. 808 (D.C., N.D., Calif., 1945).
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performance of their duties" that he did not have effective assistance of
counsel. The prisoner specified that (1) associate counsel did not con-
sult with him prior to trial; (2) counsel consulted with him only once
prior to the trial (for murder), and then for a period of only twenty
to twenty-five minutes; (3) counsel failed to subpoena witnesses re-
quested by the accused; (4) counsel failed to produce character wit-
nesses on behalf of the accused; and (5) counsel failed to effectively
cross-examine witnesses. The federal district court saw "no basis in
the averments of the petition or in the trial record for holding that the
basic doctrine of fairness under the due process clause" was violated.73
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has also denied habeas corpus to
a military prisoner who alleged-but did not prove-incompetence of
counsel. Here, however it was "assumed that a writ of habeas corpus
may be obtained on the ground that defense counsel was incompetent."74
Beets v. Hunter75 is the rare case in which a federal court finds in-
competence of counsel and discharges the prisoner for want of due
process of law. In that case court-martial counsel admitted in the
federal court "that he was wholly incompetent to represent" the ac-
cused, and testified "too plain for mistake, that he did so only on
orders." the case is sound in holding incompetence of counsel within
habeas corpus review of courts-martial, and eminently desirable in de-
ciding that proved incompetence of counsel defending an accused before
a court-martial is a denial of counsel under the Sixth Amendment."6
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
Since there is no specific exception as in the grand jury clause of
the Fifth Amendment, and no words susceptible of misconstruction as
in the Sixth, the inclusive ban on cruel and unusual punishment em-
bodied in the Eighth Amendment77 will certainly, if occasion arises, be
held applicable to sentences imposed by military or naval courts-martial.
Our cultural antipathy to this particular kind of socio-legal barbarism
is recognized in the 41st Article of War."
73 Ibid., at p. 810.
74Exkano v. Hiatt, 170 F.(2d) 93 (1948).
75 75 F.Supp. 825 (D.C., Kan., 1st Div., 1948).
76 Right to counsel is recognized by the llth Article of War, as well as by
Naval custom. Re the latter, see "Naval Courts and Boards," official pub-
lication of the Navy, p. 356. A healthy awareness that this right to counsel
means the right to effective counsel is being manifested of late by the mili-
tary authorities. See, for instance: CM ETO 4756 (1945) where sentence
was set aside because counsel failed to exercise reasonable diligence in safe-
guarding the interest of the accused; CM 281684 (1945) where sentence was
vacated because a seasonable motion for continuance for counsel to prepare
the defense was denied; CM 284066 (1944) where sentence was reversed
because the defense counsel was the accuser; CM 316898 (1946) and JAGQ-
CM 315877 in both of which sentences were vacated because the investigating
officer served as defense counsel.
77 "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted."
78 "Cruel and unusual punishments of every kind, including flogging, branding,
marking, or tattooing on the body are prohibited."
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